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It is a well known fact that R&D-driven endogenous growth models may exhibit ei-
ther under- or over-investment in R&D. The possible origins of under-investment in
R&D are clearly understood. The purpose of this paper is to explain why there may
be too much R&D. According to conventional wisdom, over-investment is caused by
a business-stealing e¤ect that arises as the latest innovator destroys and/or appropri-
ates previous incumbents rents. We argue that in standard models, business steal-
ing by itself cannot result in excessive R&D. The conventional wisdom is therefore
misleading, over-estimating the possibility that the market may be biased towards
excessive R&D. We explain the other e¤ects that must be at work for over-investment
to be possible, correcting several conjectures made in the literature.
While the term business stealing generally refers to the e¤ect that entry by
the latest innovator has on the prots of the previous incumbent, its exact meaning
is somewhat ambiguous. Some authors view business stealing simply as the loss
to the previous monopolist resulting from the latest innovation. The claim is that
over-investment is due to this pecuniary externality not being internalised by the
latest innovator. Other authors develop this idea by viewing business stealing as
a redistribution of rents from past innovators to the latest. By appropriating the
previous incumbents rents  so the argument goes  the latest innovator obtains
more than the social value of his innovation, and therefore has an excessive incentive
to invest in R&D.
We start by explaining graphically why, in standard quality-ladder models, the
cause of over-investment in R&D cannot be business stealing, whatever its exact
interpretation. Consider the market structure common to those models, characterised
by perpetual leapfrogging and price competition among successive innovators. Figure
1 shows the product market equilibrium in the case of cost-reducing innovations,
which is equivalent to the case of quality-improving innovations if goods are measured
in e¢ ciency units.
The gure shows that when a new innovation arrives, the previous incumbents
prots do not disappear but are turned into consumer surplus. This means that in
the social welfare calculation, a positive externality o¤sets a negative one. In fact,
the increase in consumer surplus caused by the latest innovation is always larger than
the past incumbents prots. In other words, there is a consumer surplus e¤ect that
always prevails over the business-stealing e¤ect. The gure also shows that not a
penny of the past incumbents prots is gathered by the latest innovator. The latest
innovator extracts his prot exclusively from the new value he creates for society.
Thus, there is no redistribution of rents from past innovators to current ones.1 ;2 This
1For a similar graphical analysis see Stoneman (2005), who also concludes that the private gain
from an innovation cannot exceed the social gain.
2 In the remainder of the paper, the term business stealing shall therefore be used to refer to
the destruction of the past incumbents rents.
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Fig. 1(a). Non-drastic innovations 
The innovation reduces the unit production cost from c0 to c1. If the 
innovation is non-drastic, as in this panel, the latest innovator sets a 
limit price p1 = c0. The area ABCD represents the past incumbent’s 
profits; the grey area CEGH, the latest innovator’s ones. The increase 
in consumer surplus, which is the area ABEC, exceeds the profit loss to 
the previous incumbent by the area BDE. The latest innovator does not 
obtain any of the profits of the previous incumbent; he obtains a share 
of the new value he has created (the area CEFH).  
Fig. 1(b). Drastic innovations 
This panel shows the case of drastic innovations. In this case, the latest 
innovator sets the monopoly price p1. Again, the area ABCD represents 
the past incumbent’s profits; the grey area FGHI, the latest innovator’s 
ones. The increase in consumer surplus now exceeds the profit loss to 
the previous incumbent by the sum of the areas BDE and CEFG. As in 
the case of non-drastic innovations, the latest innovator does not obtain 
any of the profits of the past incumbent; he obtains only a share of the 
new value he has created (which is now the area CELH).  
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implies that the social value of an innovation is always greater than its private value.3
We conclude that there is no reason for over-investment in R&D here.4 However, a
number of Schumpeterian models, starting from the seminal contributions of Aghion
and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a), have found that either under-
or over-investment in R&D may occur in the market equilibrium. If, as we contend,
business stealing cannot be held responsible for this result, then other e¤ects must.
One obvious candidate is the R&D congestion e¤ect (also known in the literature
as the crowding e¤ect, the stepping-on-toes e¤ect, or the winner-takes-all e¤ect).
This is represented by the decrease in the probability of a rms competitorssuccess
resulting from an increase in that rms R&D investment, or the corresponding in-
crease in their cost needed to achieve the innovation with a given probability. That
this negative externality can generate excessive R&D is clearly understood. How-
ever, the R&D congestion e¤ect vanishes when the returns to R&D are constant, as
in many quality-ladder models, including Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991a).
With constant returns to R&D, the only cause of over-investment is a monopoly
distortion e¤ect noted by Aghion and Howitt (1992), but hardly mentioned in subse-
quent studies. This is an equilibrium property of so-called scarce-factorsmodels,
where there is a factor of production (labour) that is in xed supply and can be used
exclusively for the production of innovative goods or for the purposes of research.
The monopoly distortion e¤ect can be described as follows. Since innovators have
market power, the markets for innovative goods are imperfectly competitive. This
means that the wage rate is lower than the marginal productivity of labour. As a
result, rms that hire labour to conduct their research are faced with a price (the
wage rate) that is lower than the true social cost of labour (its marginal productivity),
and so have an excessive incentive to invest in R&D. Mechanically speaking, the
monopoly distortion means that the production of innovative goods is ine¢ ciently
low and too little labour is employed in the innovative goods sector. Since labour
supply is xed, and the only alternative use of labour (in the model) is to conduct
R&D, then excessive labour must be employed on R&D.
The monopoly distortion e¤ect disappears in lab-equipmentmodels, where the
R&D input is the nal good rather than labour. We therefore submit that these
models cannot exhibit over-investment if there are constant returns to R&D. The
3To be precise, the argument shows that the ow social value of an innovation is greater than
the ow private value. However, while social value is a permanent addition to social welfare, the
innovators prots are terminated by the arrival of the next innovation. Thus, the gap between total
discounted social and private gains is even larger.
4The gure shows the case of constant marginal costs, i.e. the assumption commonly made in the
endogenous growth literature. However, the same conclusion would hold with increasing marginal
costs, provided that the size of the innovation is su¢ ciently large. For smaller innovations, or with
decreasing marginal costs, the equilibrium may involve mixed strategies, which would complicate the
analysis.
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rst section endeavours to prove these claims for quality ladder models, whereas
section 2 examines models with expanding product variety.
1. Quality-ladder Models
In this section, we argue that if one eliminates the monopoly distortion e¤ect from
quality-ladder models of endogenous growth, and there are no R&D congestion ef-
fects, then there cannot be any over-investment in R&D. We focus on the seminal
contributions by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a).
However, the same comments would apply to the many models that have extended
earlier theories in various ways, most notably those models with no scale e¤ects (e.g.
Howitt, 1999), and those in which the technological leader may innovate repeatedly
(e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991b). In the main text, we shall use the Aghion
and Howitt (1992) model for the purposes of our demonstration. Appendix A shows
that the same conclusions hold for the model proposed by Grossman and Helpman
(1991a).
We consider two ways of removing the monopoly distortion e¤ect. First, we retain
the scarce-factorsframework but assume that labour used in research is taxed at a
rate equal to the mark-up charged by innovators in the innovative goods sector. With
such a tax in place, the labour cost faced by research rms will equal the true social
cost. Secondly, we reformulate the model in a lab-equipmentframework, where the
R&D input is the nal good rather than labour. Within this framework, monopoly
distortions no longer a¤ect the cost of conducting the research, and so they cannot
generate excessive R&D.
1.1. Model Assumptions
In order to make the paper self-contained, we rst provide a brief account of the
assumptions of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and the derivation of the equilibrium.
There are three goods in the economy: labour, an intermediate good, and a nal
good. Labour can be employed in the production of the intermediate good or in
research, the intermediate good is used to produce the nal good, and the nal good
is consumed. The economy is populated by L identical, innitely-lived households.
Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labour and maximises the discounted
utility u =
R1
0 c()e
 rd , where r is the rate of time preference and c() the per
capita consumption of the nal good. With a linear instantaneous utility, the interest
rate is directly given by the rate of time preference r.
The quality of the intermediate good increases over time due to technical progress.
Each innovation improves said quality by a constant factor. Innovations occur at
random time intervals according to a Poisson process with a hazard rate that depends
on the rate of R&D investment. We refer to period t as the time interval between
innovation t and innovation t+ 1. The economy is stationary within each period, but
it jumps up by a constant factor from one period to the next.
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One unit of labour is required to produce one unit of the intermediate good,
regardless of the latters vintage. Normalising to one the quality of the intermedi-
ate good at time zero, and assuming that only the latest vintage is produced, the
production function of the nal good in period t is:
yt = 
txt with 0 <  < 1; (1)
where yt is the output of the nal good, xt is the input of the intermediate good, and

1
 is the size of quality improvements.
To discover higher quality products, rms engage in R&D races. There is free
entry into each race, and all rms have the same R&D technology. If nt units of labour
are used in research in period t, the new highest quality product t+1 is discovered with
an instantaneous probability nt. The parameter  is the productivity of labour in
research. The winner of a R&D race becomes the sole producer of the highest quality
product.
1.2. Equilibrium
Standard arguments imply that in equilibrium incumbents do not participate in the
race for the subsequent innovation, and so there is systematic leapfrogging. Prot
maximisation by the nal good sector leads to the following inverse demand for the
intermediate good:
pt = 
tx 1t (2)
where pt is the price. The elasticity of demand is 11  . Each vintage of the inter-
mediate good has a constant marginal cost equal to the wage rate wt. This implies
that the monopoly price is pt =
wt

, and that innovations are drastic if 
1
  1

.
In the main text we focus on the case of drastic innovations; the case of non-drastic
innovations leads to the same results and is dealt with in footnotes.5
The equilibrium wage rate is
wt = 
t2x 1t ; (3)
and innovator t earns a ow of prot equal to
t = 
t (1  )xt :6 (4)
5When innovations are non-drastic, i.e. when 
1
 <
1

, the latest innovator engages in limit
pricing. Measuring the intermediate good in e¢ ciency units relative to the last vintage, the unit cost
of vintage t   1 (the latest innovators most e¢ cient competitor) is  1wt. The limit price is then
pt = 
1
wt.
6With non-drastic innovations, the equilibrium wage rate is
wt = 
t  1
x 1t ;
and the innovators ow prot is
t = 
t

1    1

xt :
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To obtain the value of innovation t, this prot ow must be discounted by the interest
rate r augmented by the probability nt that the next innovation arrives. Therefore,
the value of innovation t is
vt =
t
r + nt
: (5)
In period t rms race to discover innovation t+ 1. The free-entry condition in patent
races requires that vt+1 be equal to the unit cost of R&D, i.e.,
vt+1 =
wt

: (6)
Although the model admits also non-stationary equilibria, we focus on steady
states where nt+1 = nt. Combining (3)-(6) and using the labour market clearing
condition xt = L nt, one nally obtains the following market equilibrium condition:
t+1(1  )(L  n)
r + n
=
t2(L  n) 1

:7 (7)
The left-hand side of (7) is the marginal private benet of R&D, and the right-hand
side is the marginal private cost, i.e. the wage rate divided by the productivity of
labour employed in R&D.
To ascertain whether there is over- or under-investment in R&D in the market
equilibrium, we evaluate the sign of the change in social welfare u associated with a
small permanent increase in the rate of innovative activity n. In a steady state, the
expected discounted utility is
u =
(L  n)
r   n(   1) : (8)
Since the model does not possess any transitional dynamics, the change in social
welfare associated with a small permanent increase in n is simply dudn . We have:
du
dn
_ (   1)
t(L  n)
r   n(   1)  
t(L  n) 1

; (9)
where the symbol _ means has the same sign as.The rst term on the right-hand
side is the discounted value of the increase in output resulting from innovation t+ 1,
(t+1   t)(L   n), which is the marginal social gain from said innovation.8 The
second term is the foregone current output when one unit of labour is used in research,
i.e. the marginal social cost of R&D.
At the market equilibrium, (9) becomes
du
dn
jn=n_ (   1)
r   n(   1)  
(1  )
r + n
: (10)
7With non-drastic innovations, the corresponding formula is
t+1

1    1

(L  n)
r + n
=
t 
1
(L  n) 1

:
8This is always positive since r > n(   1) by the transversality condition.
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1.3. Removing the Monopoly Distortion E¤ect
As Aghion and Howitt (1992) pointed out, the derivative (10) can be either positive
or negative, meaning that in the market equilibrium there may be too little, or too
much, R&D. The reason for this is that there are various di¤erences between the
marginal private and social costs and benets of conducting the research. One is
that the private cost of conducting the research (i.e., the right-hand side of (7)) is
lower than the social cost (i.e., the second term of (9)) by a factor of . This di¤erence
is due to the monopoly distortion e¤ect: because of monopoly pricing, the marginal
productivity of labour used in the production of the intermediate good is greater than
the wage rate by a factor of . As a result, rms that hire labour to conduct R&D
are faced with a labour cost that is lower than the true social cost.
We submit that this monopoly distortion e¤ect is the only possible reason for
over-investment in R&D in this model. To prove this, we remove the e¤ect and show
that, as a result, the derivative (10) is always positive.
1.3.1. A corrective tax on labour employed in R&D
One way to remove the monopoly distortion e¤ect is to impose a corrective tax. To
be precise, labour employed in R&D must be taxed at rate  equal to the mark-up
charged by innovators in the innovative goods sector, i.e.  = 1   1 (scal revenue is
then returned to consumers as a lump-sum subsidy.) This guarantees that the labour
cost perceived by R&D rms is equal to the true social cost of labour.
With this tax in place, the free entry condition in patent races becomes vt+1 = wt ;
and the equilibrium rate of innovation is given by:
t+1(1  )(L  n)
r + n
=
t(L  n) 1

:9 (11)
The only di¤erence with (7), i.e. the equilibrium condition of the original model, is
that the right-hand side is now divided by a factor of . This is how Aghion and
Howitt themselves identify the monopoly distortion e¤ect (see Aghion and Howitt,
1992, p. 338).
Although the private cost of conducting the research now coincides with the social
cost, there are still di¤erences between its private and social benets. First, the
private benet ow from the innovation (i.e., the numerator of the left-hand side of
(11)) is di¤erent from the social benet ow (i.e., the numerator of the rst term of
9With non-drastic innovations, the corrective tax is  = 
1
   1, and the modied equilibrium
condition is
t+1

1    1

(L  n)
r + n
=
t(L  n) 1

:
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(9)). Aghion and Howitt (1992) break this di¤erence down into two separate e¤ects,
the consumer surplus and the business-stealing e¤ects, which are of opposite
sign. However, we show below that the total e¤ect can be signed unambiguously.
The social benet ow from the innovation, that is to say, is always greater than the
private benet ow, which is in keeping with our graphical analysis set out in the
introduction.
Second, the private benet ow from the innovation is discounted more heavily
than the corresponding social benet ow. This reects the fact that the social benet
is permanent, whereas the innovators prots end when the next innovation arises,
and that in the market equilibrium the innovator is not rewarded for opening the way
to subsequent improvements.
These observations lead us to formulate the following:
Proposition 1 In the modied Aghion and Howitt model, where the monopoly dis-
tortion e¤ect is removed by a corrective tax on labour used in research, there is always
under-investment in R&D.
Proof. Plugging (11) into (9) we obtain
du
dn
jn=n_ (   1)
r   n(   1)  
(1  )
r + n
;
Since the denominator of the rst term is always smaller than that of the second
term, a su¢ cient condition for dudn jn=n to be positive is that:
1  1

 (1  ):
Notice that the left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in , and the condition
for innovations to be drastic is 
1
  1 . It follows that a su¢ cient condition for
du
dn jn=n to be positive is that the above inequality holds at 
1
 = 1 , that is
1     (1  )  0:10
Simple algebra shows that this condition indeed holds as an equality for  = 0 and
 = 1, and as a strict inequality for 0 <  < 1. 
10With non-drastic innovations, the relevant condition is (   1) 1

 

1    1

, or
 (; )     1
   1  1
 :
Since lim
!1
 (; ) = , we just need to show that  (; ) is non-decreasing in  on [1;  ]:We have:
@ 
@
(; ) =
1

1


   1  1
2 S(; );
where S(; ) 

1 + 
1
      

: Clearly, S(1; ) = 0 and @S
@
(; ) = 
1

 1   1  0, which
proves the result.
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The same result is obtained if instead of correcting the monopoly distortion by
imposing a tax on labour employed in R&D, one subsidises the production of the
intermediate good. The appropriate subsidy rate is s = 1   1, and the income
e¤ectsof the subsidy would be sterilised by a tax on the innovators prots at rate
1  . One immediately sees that this would lead to the same equilibrium as that of
the corrective tax on labour.
1.3.2. A lab-equipment model
Another way of removing the monopoly distortion e¤ect is to use a lab-equipment
reformulation of the model. Originally proposed by Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991)
in a model of expanding product variety, the lab-equipment formulation assumes
that the R&D input is the nal good rather than labour. Thus, monopoly pricing
distortions no longer a¤ect the cost of conducting the research.
The lab-equipment formulation has since been adopted in many quality-ladder
models as well. It is our contention that these lab-equipments models must generate
too little R&D when there are constant returns to R&D. Appendix B veries this
claim for two of the most popular lab-equipment models proposed in the quality-
ladder literature.11 However, both models modify various other assumptions made
by Aghion and Howitt (1992), allowing for a strictly concave instantaneous utility
function and many intermediate goods. In order to show that these other changes are
not responsible for the result, we develop a simple lab-equipment model that departs
from the original Aghion and Howitt model only insofar as it assumes that the nal
good, rather than labour, is the input used to carry out R&D.
The variable nt now denotes the amount of the nal good used for the purposes
of research at time t, and the labour market clearing condition is simply xt = L. The
instantaneous probability of discovery is tnt. To guarantee the existence of a steady
state, we must now assume that the productivity of the R&D input decreases over
time. The reason for this is that in a steady state the R&D investment nt must grow
by a factor of  from one period to the next. In order for the hazard rate tnt to be
constant, the R&D productivity t must then fall at a rate of . This requires the
assumption t =  t.12
The free-entry condition now becomes vt+1 =
t
 ; and the market equilibrium is
given by
t+1 (1  )L
r + t+1nt+1
=
t

: (12)
11These are the textbook models of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Acemoglu (2009). Sharing
the widely-held, albeit mistaken, belief that over-investment is due to the business stealing e¤ect,
both textbooks claim that over-investment is possible. However, Appendix B proves that this is not
the case.
12For similar knife-edge assumptions in lab-equipment models see, for example, Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004) and Acemoglu (2009). When labour is the R&D input, the cost of R&D increases
automatically at the appropriate rate, since the wage rate increases as the economy grows.
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Focusing on steady states where nt = nt, discounted social welfare is
u =
L   n
r   n(   1) : (13)
Proceeding as before, we get:
Proposition 2 In the lab-equipment version of the Aghion and Howitt model, there
is always under-investment in R&D.
Proof. The market equilibrium rate of innovation is positive if, and only if,
 (1  ) > r

L :
The marginal e¤ect on social welfare of an increase in the rate of innovation is now
du
dn
jn=n_   r

L  + (   1):
A su¢ cient condition for dudn jn=n to be positive when n > 0 is that:
1  1

 (1  ):
This is exactly the same condition found in the proof of Proposition 1, and we already
know that it is always satised. 
As we have argued in the introduction, the result follows from the fact that
with price competition and vertically-di¤erentiated products, the social value of an
innovation is always greater than its private value. When a new innovation emerges,
the increase in consumer surplus always exceeds the loss to the previous incumbent,
and there is no redistribution of rents from past to current innovators.
2. Models with Expanding Product Variety
We now turn to models of endogenous growth with expanding product variety. We
argue that the business stealing e¤ect alone cannot result in over-investment in these
models either. Unlike Schumpeterian models, however, not even the monopoly dis-
tortion e¤ect su¢ ces to generate excessive R&D: over-investment is only possible in
the presence of R&D congestion e¤ects.
These claims may sound surprising at rst. The industrial organisation litera-
ture shows that a rent-shifting e¤ect can indeed occur when goods are horizontally
di¤erentiated, and that, as a result, the private value of innovations may be grater
than their social value. This suggests that models with expanding product variety
are more likely to generate over-investment in R&D than quality-ladder models.
However, the standard specication of technology (or preferences) in expanding-
variety models precludes the possibility of over-investment in the absence of conges-
tion e¤ects. The reason for this is simple. Consider the standard Dixit and Stiglitz
10
(1977) production function
y =
 
nX
i=1
di
! 1

(14)
where  is a parameter lower than one, n now denotes the number of varieties already
invented and di the quantity of variety i. With this technology, the equilibrium price
for each variety is p = w=, with a constant mark-up of 1  . This implies that the
innovators prot is13
 = (1  ) y
n
: (15)
By increasing the number of existing varieties, innovation decreases the prots of
the past incumbents.14 However, the productivity gain created by the invention of a
new variety is:
dy
dn
=
1  

y
n
: (16)
Clearly, with a Dixit-Stiglitz production function, the innovators prot (i.e. the
private value of an innovation) is just a share  < 1 of the productivity gain created
by the innovation (its social value).15
The implications of this depend on what other assumptions are made. In scarce-
factors models, where the monopoly distortion e¤ect is at work, the wage rate is a
fraction  of the marginal productivity of labour. Therefore, research rms perceive
a labour cost that is a fraction  of the true social cost of labour. On the other hand
however, as we have just seen, the private value of an innovation is a share  of its
social value. This means that the monopoly distortion e¤ect exactly compensates
the fact that innovators do not capture the social value of innovations fully. In
the absence of other e¤ects, the rate of innovation in the market equilibrium would
be just optimal. However, in expanding variety models, sustained growth can only
be guaranteed by assuming that the invention of a new variety facilitates future
13The demand function for variety i is
pi =

y
di
1 
:
At the equilibrium price p = w=, the innovators prot is
 = (1  )y
w

  
1 
:
In a steady state in which the share of labour used in the production of intermediate good is constant,
we have
w

= n
1 

from which the expression used in the text follows.
14This is not generally true in models with expanding product variety. The specication adopted
by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (2009), for instance, implies that the introduction of new
varieties does not a¤ect the prots of past incumbents. In these models,  is independent of n.
15Equations (15) and (16) give the ow value of the innovators prots and the productivity gain,
respectively. In expanding variety models, both ows are permanent, and so the ratio between the
ows equals the ratio of the respective discounted values.
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innovation. This positive externality is another source of under-investment in R&D,
which means that the equilibrium rate of innovation must be ine¢ ciently low.
In lab-equipment models, things are simpler. The fact that the monopoly distor-
tion e¤ect vanishes immediately implies that over-investment in R&D is not possible
in the absence of R&D congestion e¤ects. Therefore, both in lab-equipment and in
scarce-factors models of expanding product variety with a Dixit-Stiglitz specication
of the technology, there can be no over-investment.
A few authors have tried to overcome this conclusion. Benassy (1998) replaces
the Dixit-Stiglitz production function (14) with
y = n
 
nX
!=1
d!
! 1

: (17)
Using this alternative formulation, he shows that over-investment in R&D is possible
when  < 0. However, when the parameter  is negative the invention of a new
variety shifts a part of the economys production possibility frontier down.16 This
means that the invention of a new good entails a kind of technological regression.
If innovation can only move the economys production possibility frontier up, the
additional parameter  cannot be negative. This reinstates the under-investment
outcome.
Jones and Williams (2000) assume that the invention of new goods occurs in clus-
ters, which include both new varieties and alternative versions of existing varieties
(which they refer to as upgrades). The upgradesare not really any more produc-
tive than existing varieties; rather, they are perfect substitutes. However, innovators
can bundle upgrades and new varieties, which allows them to extract a greater share
of the social value of the innovation at the expense of previous incumbents. That
is, bundling magnies the business stealing e¤ect. Nevertheless, Appendix C shows
that in the Jones and Williams model the possibility of over-investment in R&D is
entirely due to the R&D congestion e¤ect. In other words, with constant returns to
R&D there will always be under-investment in research.17 Appendix C also provides
an intuitive explanation for this result, by showing that the business stealing e¤ect
is again always dominated by the consumer surplus e¤ect.
3. Conclusion
16This can be easily seen by assuming that the input of the newly invented variety is nil, while
those of old varieties are the same as before the innovation: with the production function (17), output
would then be lower after the innovation if  < 0.
17 In their calibration of the model, Jones and Williams (2000) do nd that the consumer surplus
e¤ect is several times larger than the business stealing e¤ect. However, they claim that in theory the
latter e¤ect could be stronger than the former.
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This paper aims to dispel the widespread belief that business stealing by itself may
cause over-investment in R&D in models of endogenous growth. We have shown that
in standard quality-ladder models with constant returns to R&D, the source of over-
investment is a general equilibrium, monopoly distortion e¤ect that arises only in
scarce-factor models and is, arguably, an artefact of special modelling assumptions.
In models with expanding variety, not even this monopoly distortion e¤ect su¢ ces to
generate over-investment.
Our analysis therefore implies that the only robust cause of over-investment in
R&D is the congestion e¤ect that arises when the returns to R&D are decreasing.
In this case, if each innovator is small in relation the aggregate, then it will fail
to internalise the negative externality that its R&D investment imposes on others,
leading to excessive investment in R&D (Stokey, 1995).
There are several reasons why a clear understanding of the possible sources of
over-investment is important. Firstly, it provides scholars with simple guidelines as
to whether any particular model may exhibit excessive R&D or not. Secondly, it may
help in empirically evaluating whether there is too much or too little R&D investment
in real life. The key parameter appears to be the degree of decreasing returns to R&D,
which determines the magnitude of the R&D congestion e¤ects. Empirical estimates
suggests that the elasticity of the innovation production function is around 0.5,
thus indicating that returns to scale may be signicantly declining.18 Finally, our
analysis may clarify the policy implications of the theory. Consider, for instance, the
debate about the subsidisation of large or small innovations (Segerstrom, 1998; Li,
2003). The models used in this debate are a development of Grossman and Helpman
(1991a). Thus, they exhibit a monopoly distortion e¤ect which increases as the size of
the innovation increases. To the extent that the monopoly distortion e¤ect is a model
artefact, the said models may underestimate the need to subsidise large innovations
rather than smaller ones.
18For a survey of such empirical studies see, for example, Scotchmer (2004).
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Appendix A
This Appendix shows that the monopoly distortion e¤ect is the only cause of over-
investment in R&D in the model of Grossman and Helpman (1991a), too. We again
eliminate the monopoly distortion e¤ect either by assuming that labour employed on
R&D is taxed at a rate equal to the mark-up charged by innovators in the innovative
goods sector, or by reformulating the model as a lab-equipment model.
We start from the lab-equipment version of Grossman and Helpman (1991a). We
depart from the original model only insofar as the nal good, rather than labour, is the
R&D input.19 To facilitate the comparison, we use the same notation as Grossman
and Helpman (1991a).
There are three types goods: a nal good, labour, and a continuum of intermediate
goods indexed by ! 2 [0; 1]. The quality of intermediate goods increases over time
due to technical progress. Normalise the quality of each good at time zero to 1, and
denote by j(!; t) the number of innovations achieved in sector ! by time t. Thus,
the highest quality of good ! which can be produced at time t is j(!;t), where  > 1
denotes the size of each innovation.
Regardless of quality j and variety !, one unit of labour is required to produce one
unit of intermediate good. Consequently, each rm has a constant marginal cost of
production equal to the wage rate w. In each industry, successive innovators compete
in prices. As a result, in equilibrium only the state-of-the-art version of the good is
produced in each industry.
The nal good can be consumed or used as an input for R&D. This good is taken
as the numeraire. It is produced in a perfectly competitive market using intermediate
goods only. The production function is:
log y(t) =
Z 1
0
log
h
j(!;t)d(j; !; t)
i
d!;
where y(t) is the output of the nal good and d(j; !; t) denotes the input of inter-
mediate good ! of vintage j at time t. Prot maximisation by the nal good sector
implies a unit-elastic demand for the intermediate good:
d(j; !; t) =
y(t)
p(j; !; t)
where p(j; !; t) is the price.
The economy is populated by L identical, innitely-lived households. Each house-
hold inelastically supplies one unit of labour and maximises the discounted utility:
u =
Z 1
0
log c(t)e tdt;
19For expositional reasons, we follow the intermediate goods interpretation of the model and
choose a di¤erent numeraire from Grossman and Helpman, but these changes do not a¤ect the
substantive conclusions.
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where  is the rate of time preference and c(t) is the per capita consumption of the
nal good.
To discover higher quality products, rms in each industry engage in R&D races.
There is free entry into each R&D race. All rms have the same R&D technology.
Here we depart from Grossman and Helpman (1991a) by assuming that the nal
good, rather than labour, is the only input used to do R&D. Any R&D rm i that uses
ni(j; !; t) units of the nal good at time tmay discover the next higher quality product
j + 1 in industry ! with instantaneous probability ni(j;!;t)a(t) . The variable a(t) > 0
is an index of R&D cost. The returns to engaging in R&D races are independently
distributed across rms, across industries, and over time. Thus, the industrywide
instantaneous probability of success at time t is simply (j; !; t) = n(j;!;t)a(t) , where
n =
P
i ni; is the industrywide investment in R&D. Given the symmetric structure
of the model, we focus on equilibrium behaviour where the R&D intensity n(j; !; t)
is the same in all industries ! at time t, n(t).
As in Grossman and Helpmans original model, the winner of a R&D race becomes
the sole producer of the highest quality product. Standard arguments show that in
equilibrium incumbents do not participate in the race for the subsequent innovation,
so there is systematic leapfrogging.
We are interested in a steady state where output, consumption and R&D invest-
ment grow at a common and constant rate of g. Standard calculations show that
the growth rate is g =  log . To guarantee the existence of such a steady state,
we must ensure that the rate of innovation can be constant. Since in a steady state
R&D investment n(t) grows at rate of g then in order for the hazard rate  = n(t)a(t)
to be constant the unit cost of R&D, a(t), must grow at rate of g. This requires the
assumption a(t) = aegt.
Price competition between the latest innovator and the previous incumbent leads
to a limit pricing equilibrium where the quality leader sets the price p = w, earning
the prot ow
(t) =
  1

y(t):
The intertemporal maximisation problem of the representative household yields the
well-known Euler equation
_c(t)
c(t)
= r(t)  :
A standard no-arbitrage condition requires that
rv(t) = (t) + _v(t)  v(t);
where v(t) denotes the value of the leading rms. Finally, the free-entry condition
requires that the value of conducting R&D is equal to the unit R&D cost, i.e.,
v(t) = a(t):
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Combining all these equilibrium conditions we get
a(t) =
 1
 y(t)
+ 
:
Finally, using the fact that in a steady state y(t) = Legt, we can solve the above
equation to obtain the steady state rate of innovation
 =
L
a
  1

  :
This formula is identical to the one derived by Grossman and Helpman (1991a),
except that the last term on the right-hand side,  , is not divided by . This
change reects the fact that we have removed the monopoly distortion e¤ect. The
monopoly distortion e¤ect is higher, the higher is . This is intuitive, because the
monopoly distortion e¤ect reects the mark up charged in the market for innovative
good, which is proportional to .20
Proposition 3 In the modied Grossman and Helpman model with no monopoly
distortion e¤ect, there cannot be over-investment in R&D in equilibrium.
Proof. Since the economy grows at rate g =  log , discounted utility can be directly
calculated as
u =
log [L  a]

+
 log 
2
  logL
To show that there is always over-investment in R&D in the market equilibrium, we
must show that dudi ji=i> 0 whenever i > 0, that is whenever 0  a   1 L. We
have
du
di
ji=i/

1    1


L  a

1
log 
  1

:
The rst term on the right-hand side is positive for any   1: If   e, then the
second term is always non-negative, so dudi ji=i> 0. To complete the proof, assume
that 1   < e: In this case, the second term monotonically decreases with a.
Therefore, we only need to show that dudi ji=i is non-negative at a =  1 L. That is:
du
di
ji=i;a= 1

= L

1    1
 log 

 0
for 1   < e: To show that this inequality holds, consider rst of all the case  = 1.
Taking the limit, we have:
lim
!1
  1
 log 
=
lim!1 (1)
lim!1 (1 + log )
= 1;
20The fact that the monopoly distortion e¤ect increases with  does not imply that over-investment
is more likely when the size of innovations is large, as the countervailing e¤ects, which tend to generate
under-investment in R&D, are also increasing in the size of innovations. Thus, in the Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) model, the monopoly distortion e¤ect can prevail when the size of innovations is
either very large or very small.
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which means that

1   1 log 

tends to zero as  goes to 1. To complete the proof it
now su¢ ces to show that

1   1 log 

monotonically increases in  on (1; e). Indeed,
we have:
@
@

1    1
 log 

=
1
2 (log )2
(  1  log ) :
This is always positive for 1   < e. 
An alternative way of eliminating the monopoly distortion e¤ect is to assume that
labour used in research is taxed at an appropriate rate. To demonstrate this alterna-
tive approach, we now return to Grossman and Helpmans original assumption that
labour is the R&D input. Thus, n(t) now denotes the amount of labour employed in
research, and the parameter a is assumed to be constant, as in the original Grossman
and Helpman model.
To determine the tax rate needed to eliminate the monopoly distortion e¤ect,
observe that when p = w, the marginal productivity of labour, in terms of the nal
good, is w. To ensure that the labour cost perceived by research rms is equal to
the marginal productivity of labour, one needs to assume that labour used in research
is taxed at rate  =    1: The scal revenue (   1)w(t)a is paid back to market
leaders as a lump-sum subsidy that adds to their prots.21
With this tax in place, the free-entry condition in patent races becomes
v(t) = w(t)a;
and the prots obtained by the incumbent in each industry are
(t) =
  1

y(t) + (  1)w(t)a:
To solve the model, we use the free entry condition, the no-arbitrage condition, the
Euler equation, and the labour market clearing condition
L = a+
y(t)
w(t)
;
where the rst term on the right-hand side is labour used in research, and the second
is labour used in the production of intermediate goods. Oner can immediately see
that we get exactly the same market equilibrium condition as in the lab-equipment
model. The same conclusion therefore holds.
21The alternative assumption that the scal revenue is returned to consumers as a lump-sum
subsidy would further decrease the investment in R&D, reinforcing the under-investment result.
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Appendix B
This Appendix shows that there can never be over-investment in research in the
quality-ladder models of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Acemoglu (2009). For
brevity, we shall adopt the original notation of these authors and use directly their
formulas.
B.1. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)
The rate of growth of the economy in the market equilibrium is (equation (7.36) at
p. 330):
 =
(g   1)(   )
1 + (g   1) =

   
 + (g   1) 1 ;
where q is the step size of innovations,  is income share of capital, g  q 1  ;  is
the rate of time preference,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  is an
R&D cost parameter, and
 = LA
1
1 
 
1 



2
1  if q  1 (drastic innovations)
 = (q   1)LA 11  q  11  11  if q < 1 (non-drastic innovations)
is the innovators prot ow.
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), we compare the equilibrium rate of
growth  to the socially optimal one, which is (equation (7.59) at p. 341):
b = (g 1)g S   

;
where
S = LA
1
1 

1  



1
1  :
To prove that b   it su¢ ces to show that
(g   1)S  g
B.1.1. Non-drastic innovations
When innovations are non-drastic, i.e. q < 1 , inequality (g   1)S  g becomes:
(g   1)LA 11 

1  



1
1   g (q   1)LA 11  q  11  11 
which reduces to
1  

 q   1
q(q

1    1)
20
To prove that the inequality always holds, we rst show that the right-hand side
decreases in q for q 2 [1; 1 ]: We have:
@
@q
 
q   1
q(q

1    1)
!
=
1
q
2 3
1  (1  )

q

1    1
2  q+ q  1  q  1 + 1 :
Therefore,
@
@q
0@ (q   1)
q

q

1    1

1A / 1  q   (1  ) q  1  :
Notice that the right-hand side is 0 at q = 1 and decreases with q for any q 2 (1; 1 ]:
Therefore, @@q
 
(q 1)
q

q

1  1

!
< 0 for any q 2 (1; 1 ]:
Next, notice that, using LHospitals rule:
lim
q!1
(q   1)
q

q

1    1
 = limq!11
lim
q!1

q

1    1 + 1 q

1 
 = 1  

:
It follows that 1  >
q 1
q(q

1  1)
whenever 1 < q < 1 , completing the proof of the
over-investment result in the case of non-drastic innovations.
B.1.2. Drastic innovations
With drastic innovations and monopoly pricing, i.e. q  1 , inequality (g  1)S  g
becomes:
q

1    1
q

1 
> 
1
1  :
Since the left-hand side is increasing in q, it su¢ ces to prove that the above inequality
holds for q = 1 : This is equivalent to:
 

1    (1 + ) > 0
which is indeed always true for  2 (0; 1).
B.2. Acemoglu (2009)
For brevity we focus on the case of drastic innovations (as Acemoglu himself does),
but the same conclusions hold with non-drastic innovations. Acemoglus specication
of the nal good technology implies that the condition for innovations to be drastic
is  

1
1 
 1 

: The market equilibrium and socially optimal growth rates are,
respectively
g =
L  
 + (  1) 1
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and
g^ =
 (  1) (1  )  1 L  

:
In order to demonstrate the possibility of over-investment, Acemoglu uses the
following numerical example:
 = 1;  = 0:9;  = 1:3;  = 1; L = 1;  = 0:38:
With these parameter values, he correctly calculates g = 0:18231: However, the value
of g^ reported in Acemoglu (2009, p.467) is not correct. The correct value is
g^ = (1:3  1) (0:1)  10:9 (0:9)  0:38 = 3:107 2;
which is greater than g:
To prove that in fact g can never exceed g^, it su¢ ces to show that
L <  (  1) (1  )  1 L:
The economic meaning of this condition is simply that the private value ow of an
innovation is always lower than its social value ow. This inequality can be re-written
as:

(  1) < (1  )
  1
 :
Since  1 decreases with ; if the inequality is satised for  =

1
1 
 1 

(the
lowest size of innovation such that innovations are drastic), it is also satised for
 >

1
1 
 1 

: Then, all we need to show is that
 
1
1  
 1 

  1
!
(1  )  1  

1
1  
 1 

> 0
for  2 (0; 1), which is indeed always true.
Appendix C
This Appendix shows that there cannot be over-investment in R&D in the Jones
and Williams (2000) model once the R&D congestion e¤ect has been removed. The
R&D congestion e¤ect can be eliminated simply by assuming that there are constant
returns to R&D. Using Jones and Williamsnotation, this is equivalent to setting the
parameter  equal to 1.
Setting  = 1, the market equilibrium and social optimum are respectively given
by:
s =
AY (1 +  )gA
r   gY + (1 +  )gA
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s^ =
gA
r   gY + (1  )gA ;
where s is the share of R&D in national income. The meaning of the symbols here
is as follows: r is the interest rate,  is the elasticity of substitution,  is the labour
share of income,  is the number of upgrades per new variety,
 =
   1

(1  )Y
A
is the innovators prot, where  is the mark-up and YA is the output/stock of knowl-
edge ratio, which is constant in a steady state,  is an intertemporal spillover para-
meter,
 =
1

  (1  );
gA =
n
1    
where n is the rate of growth of labour supply, and
gY =


gA + n:
To show that there cannot be over-investment in R&D, we prove that the nu-
merator of s cannot exceed that of s^. It is obvious that the denominator of s is
necessarily greater than that of s^, so this su¢ ces to show that s < s^. Consider rst
the standard case where  = 0. In this case, the equilibrium mark-up  is given by
 =
1
(1  ) =

(1  ) + 1:
The numerator of s then becomes
(1  )
 + (1  )gA;
which is clearly lower than gA, i.e. the numerator of s^. Intuitively, with simple
monopoly pricing the private value of an innovation must be lower than its social
value.
Now consider the case with upgrades.By bundling upgrades and new varieties,
the innovator can spread monopolistic distortions over a greater number of goods.
It follows from standard Ramsey pricing logic that he can extract more surplus, as
in Burstein (1960). As noted by Jones and Williams (2000, p. 71), the greater is
the number of upgrades, the more evenly the monopolistic distortion can be spread,
and hence the greater is the surplus that can be extracted. However, the latest
innovator must price the bundle in such a way that buying the bundle is preferable
to buying only the upgraded varieties at a price equal to marginal cost. (Since the
original inventors of those varieties are displaced by the last innovator, they must
stand ready to provide those varieties at a price equal to marginal cost.) This places
23
an upper bound on the surplus that the latest innovator can extract, which cannot
exceed the social value of the innovation.
To show this, notice rst of all that the upper bound is attained in the limit as
 ! 1, that is when the number of upgrades is arbitrarily large. Using Jones and
Williamss formula for the mark-up with upgrades, namely
 =

1 +  
 
 
1 
;
the numerator of s becomes
   1

(1  )(1 +  )gA:
It is then easy to calculate
lim
 !1
   1

(1  )(1 +  )gA = gA;
which proves that s < s^.
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